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The objective of this paper is to investigate whether the participation of local banks exerts an impact on the 
spreads of syndicated loans in Russia. Following Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001), we aim to test whether 
local banks possess a superior ability to solve information asymmetries. In this aim, we use a sample of 528 
syndicated loans to Russian borrowers. We perform regressions of the spread on a set of variables including 
information on the participation of local banks, loan and borrower characteristics. Unlike former papers, we 
consider separately foreign banks with and without a local presence, as this presence may influence their 
monitoring ability and their information. We observe no significant impact of the participation of local 
banks in syndicated loans on the spread. We also do not find any significant influence of the presence of 
domestic-owned banks or foreign-owned banks  on the spread.  Additional estimations considering 
subsamples for which information asymmetries are exacerbated provide similar results.  Therefore our 
conclusion is that local banks do not benefit from an advantage in monitoring ability and in information in 
Russia. 
 
JEL Codes : G21, P34. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Russia is a very interesting example of an emerging market with an impressive 
growth in the recent years. The same holds true for its banking sector development, as the 
ratio of domestic credit to GDP has increased from 13.3% in 2000 to 25.7% in 2005 
(EBRD, 2006). Indeed this latter value must be compared to the world average of 55.8% 
in 2005. However, in spite of the impressive expansion in the recent years, bank lending 
remains stunningly low in Russia
1
The expansion of syndicated loans, i.e. loans for which at least two banks jointly 
grant funds to a borrower, has however contributed to a significant increase of bank 
lending in Russia in the recent years. The volume of syndicated loans in Russia has 
considerably grown from 10.9 billion dollars in 1997 to 117 billion dollars in 2006.
  Given that a positive relationship between bank 
lending and growth has long been noted in the literature (Levine, 2005), this weak level 
of bank lending may hamper the economic development of Russia. 
2 This 
expansion has largely involved non-Russian banks, as Russian banks only provide 2.22 
per cent of the funding for syndicated loans to their local borrowers.
3
Nini (2004) investigates the role of local banks by analyzing whether their 
participation in the syndicate exerts an influence on the loan spread for a sample of 
syndicated loans from emerging countries from Eastern Europe and Latin America. He 
concludes that spreads are lower for syndicated loans with local bank participation. This 
conclusion supports the view that local banks in emerging countries have a superior 
ability to solve information asymmetries. 
 
However one can wonder whether this small participation of Russian banks in 
syndicated loans does not constitute an impediment to the financial development of the 
country. Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) argue that local banks benefit from an 
advantage in monitoring ability and in information about borrowers in comparison with 
non-local banks. They support the existence of this informational advantage by observing 
that spreads on loans are lower for local banks for a sample of Argentinean loans. 
                                                 
1 Based on Rosstat, only 6,5% of investments was financed by bank loans in 2005. The correspondent 
figure for the year 2007 was 9,4%. 
2 These figures are based on computations from the authors on the Dealscan database. 
3 Our computations show that the funding provided by Russian banks in syndicated loans amounts to 5.5 
billion dollars for 2006.   3 
In line with this latter work, our objective in this paper is to investigate whether the 
participation of local banks exerts an impact on the loan spreads of syndicated loans in 
Russia. We aim to uncover whether local banks in Russia benefit from an advantage in 
monitoring ability and in information. Consequently, we can answer the question whether 
their small participation to syndicated loans contributes to hampering  financial 
development through greater loan spreads. 
We extend Nini (2004) in several aspects. While his analysis is done on a sample of 
13 emerging countries and only concerns 143 loans to Russian borrowers, our work is 
focused on Russia and includes a sample of 528 loans to Russian borrowers. 
Furthermore, we provide an important contribution by distinguishing foreign banks with 
and without a local presence. Indeed Nini (2004) defines a local bank as a domestic-
owned bank, which means that foreign-owned banks and banks from abroad are grouped 
together. However differences may exist in information and monitoring between these 
categories of banks. Foreign-owned banks may indeed benefit from better information on 
borrowers and the legal system, owing to their location in the country and their local 
staff. 
This issue is of major interest for foreign banks in their decision to establish or not 
a subsidiary in Russia. If the presence of a foreign-owned bank in a syndicated loan leads 
to a reduction of the loan spread, the conclusion that foreign-owned banks have better 
information than non-local banks is in favor of the establishment on the market to be 
competitive at the market for syndicated loans. 
The impact of the participation of domestic-owned banks to syndicated loans has 
normative implications for Russia. Russian banking industry is, unlike other transition 
countries,  still largely owned by domestic investors, especially state-controlled. 
Therefore, a finding of lower spreads for loans with domestic-owned bank participation 
would be in favor of preserving the presence of domestic-owned banks in the Russian 
banking industry, and as corollary of enhancing their participation to syndicated loans. 
In spite of the boom of syndicated loans in Russia, no paper has ever investigated 
syndicated loans in this country to our knowledge. Related literature includes few papers 
dealing either with syndicated loans in emerging markets or with the determinants of 
spreads of syndicated loans, with Nini (2004) at the crossroad of both strands of   4 
literature.  Altunbas and Gadanecz (2004) study the determinants of the spread for a 
sample of loans from emerging markets including Russia. Their investigation differs from 
ours in the sense that they focus on the potential impact of macroeconomic factors and of 
loan characteristics. Godlewski and Weill (2008) investigate  the determinants of the 
decision to syndicate a loan on a sample of loans from emerging countries including 
Russia.  Three recent papers study  the spreads of syndicated loans but with different 
purposes than ours. Carey and Nini (2007) investigate why loan spreads are smaller for 
corporate borrowers in Europe than in the US. Foccarelli, Pozzolo and Casolaro (2008) 
analyze whether the share of the arranger exerts an impact on the loan spread on a sample 
of loans from 80 countries. Finally, Ivashina (2007) investigate how information 
asymmetries between the banks participating to a lending syndicate affect the loan spread 
on a sample of US syndicated loans. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some features for 
the loan syndication process and the syndicated loan market in Russia. Section 3 presents 
data and variables, and section 4 displays the results. Section 5 provides conclusion. 
 
II. Loan syndication in emerging markets 
 
This section explains how the loan syndication process is implemented in the first 
subsection, and highlights features of syndicated loans in Russia in the second subsection. 
 
II.1 The loan syndication process 
 
Bank loan syndication is a sequential process, which can be separated into three 
main stages
4
                                                 
4 See Esty (2001) for a detailed presentation of syndication. 
. During the pre-mandated stage, after soliciting competitive offers to 
arrange and manage the syndication with one or more banks (usually the main banks of 
the borrower), the borrower chooses one or more arrangers that are mandated to form a 
syndicate and negotiates a preliminary loan agreement. The syndication can be sole or   5 
joint mandated, the latter involving the participation of more than one lead bank
5. The 
arranger is responsible for the negotiation of key loan terms with the borrower, the 
appointment of participants
6
The first syndicated loans contracts in Russia were made already in 1995. Due to 
the collapse of the world capital markets in 1997, more advantageous financing through 
eurobonds was not available to the Russian banks and companies and they had to turn to 
syndicated loans market. Moreover, syndicated loans were the only financing option for 
many  large  firms, since they required no credit rating. Consequently the amounts of 
  and the structuring of the syndicate. At this stage, the 
arranger is responsible for placing the syndicated loan with other banks and ensuring that 
it is fully subscribed. His compensation is mainly composed of various fees (agency, 
arrangement, commitment, for example). 
The post-mandated stage involves the placement of the loan. In that aim, the 
arranger prepares a documentation package for the potential syndicate members, called 
an information memorandum. It usually contains information about borrower 
creditworthiness and loan terms. The initial  set of targeted participants is strongly 
determined by the arranger. A roadshow is then organized to present and discuss the 
content of the information memorandum, as well as to announce closing fees and 
establish a timetable for commitments and closing. The participants can make comments 
and suggestions in order to influence the structure and the pricing of the loan. After the 
roadshow, the arranger makes formal invitations to potential participants and determines 
the allocation given to each participant. 
The third and last phase takes place after the completion date when the deal 
becomes active and the loan is operational, binding the borrower and the syndicate 
members by the debt contract. The latter sets out the terms and conditions of the loan: the 
amount, the purpose, the period, the rate of interest plus any fees, the periodicity and the 
design of repayments and the presence of any collateral. 
 
II.2 Loan syndication in Russia 
 
                                                 
5 Such syndications are usually chosen by the borrower in order to maximize the likelihood of a successful 
syndication, in terms of loan characteristics, subscription and duration of the syndication process. 
6 Participants lend a portion of the loan and receive a compensation essentially composed of a spread.   6 
syndicated loans in Russia grew significantly in 1997. The 1998 financial crisis hampered 
this development and the amount of syndicated loans continued to decrease also in the 
following years. Nevertheless, the consequent fast economic growth in Russia resulted in 
ever increasing demand for financing, especially of long-term nature. Underdeveloped 
banking sector was not able to provide necessary financing. Domestic bank loans were 
used to finance only 5% of investments in 2003 and about half of invested capital 
originated from retained earnings  (The Banker, 2004). Majority of the remaining 
investments was therefore financed by borrowing from abroad. With rising confidence in 
the Russian economy and some credit history of Russian firms, foreign banks started to 
be more interested in the Russian market as well. All of these factors were reflected in 
significant increase in the amount of syndicated loans for Russian companies in 2003 
when total amount reached $34.2 billion. Naturally, the most attractive borrowers were 
big oil and gas companies as well as banks. Mini-bank crises together with the Yukos 
affair hit Russian domestic business sentiment hard in 2004 which was reflected in the 
desire to invest and consequently in slight decrease of the amount of syndicated loans. 
Their growth has however further continued from 2006. 
 
III. Data and variables 
 
III.1 Data 
The sample of syndicated loans  consists of all loan facilities  in the Dealscan 
database, provided by the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC, Reuters), where the borrower 
is from Russia. Data on loan characteristics come  from  the  Dealscan  database.  Data 
concerning borrower characteristics come from Ruslana database provided by Bureau 
Van Dijk. Data on ownership of Russian banks come from the Central Bank of Russia. 
Following  Qian and Strahan (2007) and Ivashina (2008), we skip  loans to 
financial companies owing to the specificities of these firms in comparison to others 
(different risk, different capital structure with notably a greater leverage). The sample 
size is determined by information availability of the variables used in the regressions. We 
therefore have a sample of 528 loan facilities for the period between 1997 and 2006. As   7 
expected, more than half of these loans (320) are for the companies that operate in the oil 
and gas industry. 
 
III.2 Variables 
We focus on the potential impact of the role of the nationality of lenders on the loan 
spread. In this aim, we proceed to regressions of the spread on a set of variables including 
variables on the nationality of lenders and some control variables. 
The explained variable in our regressions is the spread on the base rate in basis 
points (Spread). A local bank is defined as a Russian bank which means a bank domiciled 
in Russia. It can therefore be a domestic-owned or a foreign-owned bank. The presence 
of a local bank is taken into account through a dummy variable equal to one if at least one 
local bank participates in the syndicate (Local). We also distinguish between categories 
of  local banks by using dummy variables equal to one whether a domestic-owned 
(Domestic  Owned) or a foreign-owned bank  (Foreign  Owned)  participates  in the 
syndicate. Foreign-owned bank is a bank with foreign ownership share exceeding 50%. 
We control for loan characteristics in the estimations. Loan size (Loan Amount) is 
the amount of the loan facility. We control for the maturity of the loan (Maturity). The 
presence of covenants (Covenants) and guarantors (Guarantors) in the loan contract are 
taken into account by introducing dummy variables. We consider loan type through a 
dummy variable equal to one if the loan is a term loan or to zero otherwise (Term Loan). 
We include dummy variables to describe the purpose of the loan, including debt 
repayment, general corporate purpose, or trade finance, as well as to take the loan 
benchmark rate (Euribor and Libor) into account. 
We also consider borrower characteristics among control variables. Following 
Focarelli, Pozzolo and Casolaro (2008), we include size measured by total assets (Size), 
debt ratio defined by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Debt ratio), and return on 
assets measured by the ratio of profit before tax to total assets (ROA). We also control for 
the fact that the borrower is listed by including a dummy variable equal to one if the 
borrower is listed on the stock exchange (Listed).   8 
Table 1 lists descriptive statistics for the variables
7
                                                 
7 There is no significant difference between the descriptive statistics for syndicated loans with a without the 
participation of a local lender. 
. Appendix A.1 provides their 
definition. We observe that the average spread is 153.4 basis points, which is of the same 
order of magnitude as the average spread of 161.7 basis points observed by Focarelli, 
Pozzolo and Casolaro (2008) in their analysis on 80 countries. Only 6.12 per cent of 
syndicated  loans include at least one Russian bank. These participants  are more 
frequently foreign-owned banks (3.99  per cent  of loans) than domestic-owned banks 
(2.13 per cent of loans). As expected, syndicated loans are large with an average amount 
of 203 million USD. The maturity of loans is 46 months on average, which may appear 
relatively short at first glance. Nevertheless, as corporate loans in Russia are usually 
provided for 2 or 3 years, this average maturity is in fact quite long. This is in accordance 
with the observation in transition countries that most loans are granted on a short-term 
basis. The presence of covenants and guarantors is scarce, being respectively observed in 
7.71 per cent and 4.27 per cent of loan contracts.  Finally a vast majority of loans are 
term loans (83.55 per cent). 
In line with the size of the loan facilities, borrowers are large companies, which are 
generally listed. Debt ratio can appear at first glance very high with a mean of 45.08%, 
meaning that equity represents more than half of the total balance sheet.  This  is 
commonly observed in transition countries (e.g. Delannay and Weill, 2004) and has to be 
relied with the difficulties to obtain financing of companies, which was pointed out for 
Russia by Pissarides, Singer and Svejnar (2000). Profitability is relatively high with an 
average ROA for 13.55 per cent, which can be explained by the flourishing economic 




This section displays our results.  We first present the main estimations, before 
displaying some additional tests. 
   9 
IV.1 Main estimations 
 
We perform regressions of the spread on a set of variables including information on 
the participation of local banks in the loan and control variables. Dummy variables for 
years are included in the estimations. We consider two panels for all specifications. Panel 
A reports the results for all syndicated loans, and includes 528 loans. Panel B reports the 
results for the 351 loans for which borrower characteristics are known. 
In table 2, we investigate whether the presence of a local bank exerts an influence 
on the spread. The results in panels A and B show  that the variable Local  is not 
significant.  This lack of significance is not dependent of the presence of borrower 
characteristics as it is observed in both estimations. Therefore, the main finding is that we 
find no support for the view that the participation of local banks to syndicated loans 
reduces information asymmetries between the borrower and the lenders in Russia. 
Two control variables for loan characteristics are significant. We observe a negative 
and significant coefficient for Loan Amount, in line with former papers (Nini, 2004; 
Focarelli, Pozzolo and Casolaro, 2008). It can result either from the existence of 
economies of scale in lending, or from the fact that larger borrowers are considered as 
safer customers. Maturity  is significantly negative in all estimations, which is also 
commonly observed in other studies. As the maturity of loans is relatively short, this 
result can be explained by the fact that loans with longer duration are associated with 
lower default risk. 
Turning to the borrower characteristics, we observe a significantly negative 
coefficient for Size, which results from the fact that a larger size is associated with a 
lower default risk. The negative sign for Debt ratio can appear surprising at first glance. 
As greater debt ratio  means greater indebtedness, one could expect that greater debt 
increases the spread by deteriorating the financial situation of the borrower. Nevertheless, 
debt can be perceived as a signal for the good quality of the borrower and then 
contributes to reduce spread in Russia for two reasons. On the one hand, following Ross 
(1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977), debt can be adopted as a signal in order to convey 
valuable information to the lenders. Indeed issuance of debt leads to a higher probability 
of default due to the debt-servicing costs which represent a costly outcome for firm   10 
managers and shareholders. This signalling role of debt is particularly relevant in 
countries characterized by greater ex ante information asymmetries. As Russia is marked 
by a limited experience of banks with almost all of them established only short time ago 
and  with  a short history of  relationships between banks and borrowers, it  can be 
considered such country. On the other hand, the difficulties to obtain financing for 
Russian companies lead also to the fact that greater debt can be perceived as a good 
signal for lenders, by showing the ability of the bank to obtain loans in the past. 
We now investigate if domestic-owned banks differ from foreign-owned ones in 
their ability to solve  information asymmetries.  Indeed the absence of impact of the 
presence of a local bank in the first estimations may come from the fact that we have 
grouped both categories of banks, while only domestic-owned banks may have a better 
ability to solve information asymmetries. In table 3, we regress the spread on  the 
variables taking the participation of both categories  of local banks in the  loan into 
account.  However our results suggest no difference between domestic-owned and 
foreign-owned banks. The coefficient for Domestic Owned is significantly negative in 
panel A, but this result is not robust as the addition of borrower characteristics in panel B 
leads to a non-significant coefficient. The coefficient for Foreign Owned  is not 
significant in both estimations.  The results for control variables are similar to those 
observed in the previous estimations. 
In a nutshell, we have two main findings. The first finding is that domestic-owned 
banks do not have a better ability to solve information asymmetries in Russia. This is a 
major difference with Nini (2004) who concludes that syndicated loans with the 
participation of domestic-owned banks have lower spreads in emerging countries. Several 
elements can explain this finding. 
First, domestic-owned banks may not have an experience old enough to benefit 
from better information on borrowers. Most  banks have been established relatively 
recently with the expansion of banks at the very beginning of the 90s and a considerable 
amount of bank failures from this date. Furthermore, most of the syndicated loan 
borrowers in Russia are global companies operating on international markets and local 
banks do not have enough expertise in this area either.   11 
Second, foreign banks with and without local presence may benefit from better 
technology and know-how in risk analysis that allow them to offset the informational 
advantage of domestic-owned banks. Indeed this advantage has been advanced in the 
literature to explain the fact that, while domestic-owned banks are more cost-efficient 
than foreign-owned banks in developed countries, the finding is reversed in transition 
countries (Weill, 2003, Hasan and Marton, 2003, Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2005). 
Third, it may also be the result of the high level of corruption in Russia, as observed 
by the fact that Russia is ranked 143rd out of 169 countries in 2007 according to 
Transparency  International.  Corruption can exert a positive impact on spreads by 
resulting in a waste of any informational advantage offset by illegal practices. Russian 
banks are more affected by corruption than non-local banks which are established in 
Western countries being all by far less corrupt. Furthermore, among local banks, 
domestic-owned banks are expected to suffer more from corruption than foreign-owned 
banks, which have more often foreign managers that have more incentives to refuse any 
bribe. 
The second main finding is the absence of an advantage in information for foreign-
owned banks in comparison with non-local banks. We therefore do not provide support to 
the motive for establishing a bank in Russia to obtain better information on the borrowers 
and the environment rather than participating to loans from abroad. This conclusion is of 
interest in Russia where a relative degree of uncertainty on stability and state intervention 
may refrain foreign banks from establishing a subsidiary in the country. 
 
IV.2 Additional estimations 
 
To go deeper in the analysis, we split the sample along dimensions related to the 
importance of informational problems. 
Our first split is between listed and not listed companies. Information asymmetries 
should be lower for listed companies owing to the obligations to provide information for 
these companies. The advantage in monitoring ability and in information for local banks 
should then play a lesser role when participating in a syndicated loan to a listed company.   12 
The result that the variable Listed was not significant in our first estimations might 
be explained by the fact that there are no differences in information asymmetries between 
listed and not-listed companies, as they are all charged  with spreads which are not 
significantly different. Nevertheless, one has to investigate whether the behaviour of 
banks differs according to their ability to solve information asymmetries. 
In table 4, we analyze whether the presence of a local bank in the syndicate exerts 
an influence on the spread depending on the fact that the borrower is listed or not. The 
results in panels A and B show no significant coefficient for Local. Table 5 considers the 
participation of a domestic-owned bank or of a foreign-owned bank in the syndicate. 
Here again the variables for the participation of local banks are not significant. As a 
consequence, our findings support the view that local and non-local banks do not differ in 
the ability to solve information asymmetries, depending on the fact that the borrower is 
listed or not.  
Our second split is with respect to the size of the loan, following notably Focarelli, 
Pozzolo and Casolaro (2008). The assumption is that larger loans are generally granted to 
larger and more transparent borrowers. We define small loans to be under 150 million 
USD. As a consequence, the advantage in monitoring ability or in information for local 
banks should be higher for small loans. In table 6, we investigate whether the presence of 
a local bank in the syndicate exerts a different impact on the spread if the loan is large or 
small. All estimations show no significant coefficient for Local. We also test variables 
taking into account the participation of a domestic-owned bank or a foreign-owned bank 
in the estimations in table 7. While the coefficient of Foreign Owned is never significant, 
we obtain a significantly negative coefficient for Domestic Owned  for the sample of 
small loans in Panel A. Nevertheless, this result is not robust to the inclusion of borrower 
characteristics in Panel B that leads to a non-significant coefficient.  Therefore, these 
results corroborate our conclusion regarding the absence of any informational advantage 
for domestic-owned banks or more generally for local banks. Even for small loans, we do 
not observe a significant impact of the presence of such banks on the spread.    13 
All in all, our main findings are supported by these additional estimations as well. 
We find no informational advantage for local banks whether  their ownership is  in 
domestic or foreign hands
8
                                                 
8 Furthermore, we obtain virtually same results when performing the regressions on a sub-sample of loans 





In this paper, we investigate whether the presence of local banks in a syndicated 
loan exerts an influence on the spread in Russia. This study allows us therefore to put into 
evidence a possible advantage in solving information asymmetries for local banks in this 
country, which has been observed for emerging economies by Nini (2004). 
We find no evidence that the participation of local banks contributes to lower 
spreads for syndicated loans to Russian borrowers. This finding is observed for domestic-
owned as well as for foreign-owned banks, as we distinguish between these categories of 
local banks.  Additional estimations in which we consider subsamples for which 
information asymmetries are exacerbated provide similar results. 
Consequently, our conclusion is that local banks do not have any informational 
advantage in comparison to non-local banks, which would benefit borrowers by enjoying 
lower loan spreads. Furthermore, neither domestic-owned banks relative to foreign banks 
with and without a subsidiary in Russia, nor foreign-owned banks relative to non-local 
banks have such advantage. The absence of any advantage for local banks may result 
from their short experience that limits their ability to acquire better information about 
borrowers but also from corruption which affects more local banks in particular domestic 
owned ones. 
The implications of these results are numerous. For policy advisors, the persistence 
of an important domestic-owned banking industry in Russia cannot be motivated by 
arguments based on a better ability of local banks to solve information asymmetries and 
then provide loans with lower spreads. For foreign bankers, the establishment of a bank 
in Russia cannot be justified by the fact that a presence in Russia is required to be 
competitive in loan pricing as it provides access to better information.   14 
Our analysis can be extended in a number of ways. Further work would be required 
to provide more evidence on the determinants of loan spreads in Russia. Furthermore, it 
would be particularly interesting to assess whether our findings are also observed for 
single-lender loans. 
   15 
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Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. Spread is in basis points. Maturity is in months. Loan 
Amount  and  Size  are  logarithms of amounts in thousand dollars. Debt ratio  and  Profitability  are in 
percentage. 
 
    Mean  Std Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Spread  153.403  131.469  11  562.5 
Local  0.0613  0.2399  0  1 
Domestic Owned  0.0213  0.1445  0  1 
Foreign Owned  0.0399  0.1958  0  1 
Loan Amount  19.14  1.14  14.79  21.82 
Maturity  46.07  16.48  2  120 
Guarantors  0.0427  0.2022  0  1 
Covenants  0.0771  0.2668  0  1 
Term Loan  0.8355  0.3708  0  1 
Size  24.23  2.15  16.50  27.17 
Debt ratio  0.4508  0.2027  0.0799  0.8758 
ROA  0.1355  0.0902  -0.0617  0.4896 
Listed  0.6669  0.4715  0  1 
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Table 2 
Participation of a local bank 
 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Spread. Table reports 
coefficients and robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 
10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for loan purpose, benchmark rate, and year are included in the 
regressions but are not reported. 
 
  Regressions 
  Panel A    Panel B   
Explanatory variables  Coefficient  Std error  Coefficient  Std error 
Intercept  749.441***  100.09  977.537***  120.84 
Local  -29.631  20.37  -7.894  14.12 
Loan Amount  -20.612***  4.43  -12.114***  4.13 
Maturity  -0.826**  0.36  -1.020*  0.58 
Guarantors  5.107  19.09  32.114  41.27 
Covenants  -17.287  18.47  -22.970  27.75 
Term Loan  13.504  14.44  14.936  23.58 
Size  -  -  -16.125***  3.31 
Debt ratio  -  -  -156.916***  36.41 
ROA  -  -  31.445  56.76 
Listed  -  -  -16.655  20.70 
Number of observations  528    345   
Adjusted R²  0.7838    0.8556   
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Table 3 
Participation of a domestic-owned or a foreign-owned bank 
 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable  is  Spread. Table reports 
coefficients and robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 
10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for loan purpose, benchmark rate, and year are included in the 
regressions but are not reported. 
 
  Regressions 
  Panel A    Panel B   
Explanatory variables  Coefficient  Std error  Coefficient  Std error 
Intercept  762.002***  99.90  984.89***  105.92 
Domestic Owned  -56.619*  29.25  -7.994  24.41 
Foreign Owned  14.625  18.27  -7.753  9.69 
Loan Amount  -21.166***  4.42  -12.117***  4.14 
Maturity  -0.863**  0.36  -1.020*  0.59 
Guarantors  5.040  19.38  32.096  42.02 
Covenants  -18.486  18.11  -22.971  27.78 
Term Loan  12.601  14.32  14.926  23.49 
Size  -  -  -16.124***  3.29 
Debt ratio  -  -  -156.943***  37.49 
Profitability  -  -  31.424  57.17 
Listed  -  -  -16.638  21.50 
Number of observations  528    345   
Adjusted R²  0.7863    0.8556   
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Table 4 
Participation of a local bank: comparison between listed and unlisted companies 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Spread. Table reports coefficients and robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote an 
estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for loan purpose, benchmark rate, and year are included in the regressions 
but are not reported. 
 
  Panel A  Panel B 
  Listed  Unlisted  Listed  Unlisted 
Explanatory variables  Coefficient  Std error  Coefficient  Std error  Coefficient  Std error  Coefficient  Std error 
Intercept  448.910***  54.35  1141.226***  155.65  -54.348  487.57  1046.383***  106.75 
Local  -8.803  16.48  -4.231  23.31  -9.370  9.72  -22.827  16.01 
Loan Amount  -4.467  6.02  -52.059***  7.56  -3.778*  1.96  -12.282*  6.57 
Maturity  0.333  0.86  -1.351***  0.51  5.622***  1.71  -1.835***  0.39 
Guarantors  55.480  43.51  -24.349  28.41  7.388  98.11  37.658  39.75 
Covenants  42.250  33.57  -49.229**  22.58  -24.378  71.79  -9.547  41.34 
Term Loan  47.600*  24.34  23.612  22.62  -191.648***  66.43  52.980*  27.36 
Size  -  -  -  -  26.578  23.42  -19.132***  4.86 
Debt ratio  -  -  -  -  108.281  126.09  -155.066***  53.74 
ROA  -  -  -  -  -688.647***  231.16  102.327  88.28 
Number of observations  289    239    215    130   
Adjusted R²  0.8467    0.7548    0.9116    0.8091   
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Table 5 
Participation of a domestic-owned or a foreign-owned bank: comparison between listed and unlisted companies 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Spread. Table reports coefficients and robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote an 
estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for loan purpose, benchmark rate, and year are included in the regressions 
but are not reported. 
 
  Panel A  Panel B 
  Listed  Unlisted  Listed  Unlisted 
Explanatory variables  Coefficient  Std error  Coefficient  Std error  Coefficient  Std error  Coefficient  Std error 
Intercept  450.807***  156.54  1144.312***  156.82  -49.766  486.53  1034.708***  105.83 
Domestic Owned  -11.183  21.87  -15.950  45.96  -11.875  13.85  -11.964  40.93 
Foreign Owned  -1.733  5.13  4.181  24.65  -3.777  2.73  -25.588  18.81 
Loan Amount  -4.536  6.02  -52.111***  7.59  -3.851**  1.93  -12.256*  6.61 
Maturity  0.330  0.86  -1.371***  0.50  5.605***  1.72  -1.817***  0.40 
Guarantors  55.331  43.57  -23.996  28.71  5.939  99.06  39.175  42.97 
Covenants  41.932  33.72  -48.995**  22.31  -24.848  71.67  -9.935  41.24 
Term Loan  47.665*  24.35  22.969  23.19  -192.037***  66.62  52.973*  27.51 
Size  -  -  -  -  26.556  23.43  -19.092***  4.83 
Debt ratio  -  -  -  -  106.077  126.89  -153.397***  53.89 
ROA  -  -  -  -  -689.463***  231.49  102.956  88.93 
Number of observations  289    239    215    130   
Adjusted R²  0.8467    0.7548    0.9117    0.8092   
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Table 6 
Participation of a local bank: comparison between large and small loans 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Spread. Each Panel reports respectively the results for small loans (below USD 150 
million) and for large loans (above USD 150 million). Table reports coefficients and robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different 
from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for loan purpose, benchmark rate, and year are included in the regressions but are not reported. 
 
  Panel A  Panel B 
  Large loans  Small loans  Large loans  Small loans 
Explanatory variables  Coefficient  Std error  Coefficient  Std error  Coefficient  Std error  Coefficient  Std error 
Intercept  484.040***  55.07  1244.129***  247.44  333.189  306.69  1101.458***  291.07 
Local  -12.918  21.17  -32.991  23.37  12.453  13.86  -10.026  21.06 
Loan Amount  -2.207  2.27  -47.883***  13.29  0.200  0.91  -19.501  18.97 
Maturity  -0.553  0.65  -1.364***  0.40  -4.883***  1.81  -1.522**  0.65 
Guarantors  71.913**  32.28  -30.343  20.61  96.928  138.21  12.093  66.10 
Covenants  -54.923  37.67  0.792  23.72  98.955*  49.82  -15.842  35.01 
Term Loan  35.129*  18.22  -5.798  20.46  55.621  58.71  32.043  38.82 
Size  -  -  -  -  -3.729  11.44  -10.621***  3.95 
Debt ratio  -  -  -  -  -166.392  162.47  -171.514***  56.17 
ROA  -  -  -  -  311.924**  124.76  -70.802  93.81 
Listed  -  -  -  -  -40.117  30.10  -15.645  28.05 
Number of observations  278    250    222    123   
Adjusted R²  0.8883    0.6741    0.9691    0.7507   
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Table 7 
Participation of a domestic-owned or a foreign-owned bank: comparison between large and small loans 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Spread. Each Panel reports respectively the results for small loans (below USD 150 
million) and for large loans (above USD 150 million). Table reports coefficients and robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different 
from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for loan purpose, benchmark rate, and year are included in the regressions but are not reported. 
 
  Panel A  Panel B 
  Large loans  Small loans  Large loans  Small loans 
Explanatory variables  Coefficient  Std error  Coefficient  Std error  Coefficient  Std error  Coefficient  Std error 
Intercept  484.041***  55.07  1269.551***  247.35  333.189  306.69  1080.341***  296.58 
Domestic Owned  -  -  -50.386*  29.45  -  -  -3.475  27.14 
Foreign Owned  -12.918  21.17  16.272  26.52  12.453  13.86  -33.599  25.05 
Loan Amount  -2.208  2.27  -49.027***  13.48  0.200  0.91  -18.046  19.59 
Maturity  -0.553  0.65  -1.396***  0.39  -4.883***  1.81  -1.530**  0.65 
Guarantors  71.913**  32.28  -29.702  21.00  96.928  138.21  12.211  66.24 
Covenants  -54.923  37.67  -2.463  23.84  98.955**  49.82  -15.082  35.50 
Term Loan  35.129*  18.22  -6.619  20.34  55.621  58.71  33.592  38.53 
Size  -  -  -  -  -3.729  11.44  -10.813***  4.05 
Debt ratio  -  -  -  -  -166.392  162.47  -167.867***  56.68 
ROA  -  -  -  -  311.924**  124.76  -68.693  93.04 
Listed  -  -  -  -  -40.117  30.10  -17.198  28.81 
Number of observations  278    250    222    123   
Adjusted R²  0.8883    0.6774    0.9691    0.7512   
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Appendix A.1: Brief description of all variables and their sources 
 
 
Variable  Description  Source 
Loan contract characteristics   
Syndicated  =1 if the loan is syndicated  Dealscan 
Loan Amount  Logarithm of the size of the loan in dollars  Dealscan 
Maturity  Maturity of the loan in months  Dealscan 
Guarantors  =1 if there is at least one guarantor  Dealscan 
Covenants  =1 if the loan agreement includes covenants  Dealscan 
Term Loan  =1 if the facility is a term loan  Dealscan 
   
Borrower characteristics   
Size  Logarithm of the size of the company in dollars  Ruslana 
Debt ratio  Total liabilities to total assets  Ruslana 
ROA  Ratio of profit before tax to total assets  Ruslana 
Listed  =1 if the borrower is listed on the stock exchange  Dealscan 
     
Lender nationality   
Local  =1 if one Russian bank participates to the loan  CBR 
Domestic Owned  =1 if one Russian domestic-owned bank 
participates to the loan 
CBR 
Foreign Owned  =1 if one Russian foreign-owned bank 




                     
Working Papers 
 




D.R. n° 1  "Bertrand Oligopoly with decreasing returns to scale", J. Thépot, décembre 1993 
 
D.R. n° 2   "Sur quelques méthodes d'estimation directe de la structure par terme des taux d'intérêt", P. Roger - N. 
Rossiensky, janvier 1994 
 
D.R. n° 3   "Towards a Monopoly Theory in a Managerial Perspective", J. Thépot, mai 1993 
 
D.R. n° 4                 "Bounded Rationality in Microeconomics", J. Thépot, mai 1993 
 
D.R. n° 5   "Apprentissage Théorique et Expérience Professionnelle", J. Thépot, décembre 1993 
 
D.R. n° 6   "Strategic Consumers in a Duable-Goods Monopoly", J. Thépot, avril 1994 
 
D.R. n° 7   "Vendre ou louer ; un apport de la théorie des jeux", J. Thépot, avril 1994 
 
D.R. n° 8   "Default Risk Insurance and Incomplete Markets", Ph. Artzner - FF. Delbaen, juin 1994 
 
D.R. n° 9   "Les actions à réinvestissement optionnel du dividende", C. Marie-Jeanne - P. Roger, janvier 1995 
 
D.R. n° 10          "Forme optimale des contrats d'assurance en présence de coûts administratifs pour l'assureur", S. Spaeter, 
février  1995 
 
D.R. n° 11   "Une procédure de codage numérique des articles", J. Jeunet, février 1995 
 
D.R. n° 12   "Stabilité d'un diagnostic concurrentiel fondé sur une approche markovienne du comportement de rachat 
du consommateur", N. Schall, octobre 1995 
 
D.R. n° 13   "A direct proof of the coase conjecture", J. Thépot, octobre 1995 
 
D.R. n° 14   "Invitation à la stratégie", J. Thépot, décembre 1995 
 
D.R. n° 15   "Charity and economic efficiency", J. Thépot, mai 1996 
 
D.R. n° 16   "Pricing anomalies in financial markets and non linear pricing rules", P. Roger, mars 1996 
 
D.R. n° 17   "Non linéarité des coûts de l'assureur, comportement de prudence de l'assuré et contrats optimaux", S. 
Spaeter, avril 1996 
 
D.R. n° 18   "La valeur ajoutée d'un partage de risque et l'optimum de Pareto : une note", L. Eeckhoudt - P. Roger, juin 
1996 
 
D.R. n° 19   "Evaluation of Lot-Sizing Techniques : A robustess and Cost Effectiveness Analysis", J. Jeunet, mars 1996 
 
D.R. n° 20   "Entry accommodation with idle capacity", J. Thépot, septembre 1996 
 ii 
 
D.R. n° 21   "Différences culturelles et satisfaction des vendeurs : Une comparaison  internationale", E. Vauquois-
Mathevet - J.Cl. Usunier, novembre 1996 
 
D.R. n° 22  "Evaluation des obligations convertibles et options d'échange", Schmitt - F. Home, décembre 1996 
 
D.R n° 23  "Réduction d'un programme d'optimisation globale des coûts et diminution du temps de calcul, J. Jeunet, 
décembre 1996 
 
D.R. n° 24  "Incertitude, vérifiabilité et observabilité : Une relecture de la théorie de l'agence", J. Thépot, janvier 1997 
 
D.R. n° 25  "Financement par augmentation de capital avec asymétrie d'information :  l'apport du paiement du 
dividende en actions", C. Marie-Jeanne, février 1997 
 
D.R. n° 26  "Paiement du dividende en actions et théorie du signal", C. Marie-Jeanne, février 1997 
 
D.R. n° 27  "Risk aversion and the bid-ask spread", L. Eeckhoudt - P. Roger, avril 1997 
 
D.R. n° 28  "De l'utilité de la contrainte d'assurance dans les modèles à un risque et à  deux risques", S. Spaeter, 
septembre 1997 
 
D.R. n° 29  "Robustness and cost-effectiveness of lot-sizing techniques under revised demand forecasts", J. Jeunet, 
juillet 1997 
 
D.R. n° 30  "Efficience du marché et comparaison de produits à l'aide des méthodes  d'enveloppe (Data envelopment 
analysis)", S. Chabi, septembre 1997 
 
D.R. n° 31  "Qualités de la main-d'œuvre et subventions à l'emploi : Approche microéconomique", J. Calaza - P. Roger, 
février 1998 
 
D.R n° 32  "Probabilité de défaut et spread de taux : Etude empirique du marché français", M. Merli - P. Roger, février 
1998 
 
D.R. n° 33  "Confiance et Performance : La thèse de Fukuyama", J.Cl. Usunier - P. Roger, avril 1998 
 
D.R. n° 34  "Measuring the performance of lot-sizing techniques in uncertain environments", J. Jeunet - N. Jonard, 
janvier 1998 
 
D.R. n° 35  "Mobilité et décison de consommation : premiers résultas dans un cadre monopolistique", Ph. Lapp, 
octobre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 36  "Impact du paiement du dividende en actions sur le transfert de richesse et la dilution du bénéfice par 
action", C. Marie-Jeanne, octobre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 37  "Maximum resale-price-maintenance as Nash condition", J. Thépot, novembre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 38  "Properties of bid and ask prices in the rank dependent expected utility model", P. Roger, décembre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 39  "Sur la structure par termes des spreads de défaut des obligations », Maxime Merli / Patrick Roger, 
septembre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 40  "Le risque de défaut des obligations : un modèle de défaut temporaire de  l’émetteur", Maxime Merli, 
octobre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 41  "The Economics of Doping in Sports", Nicolas Eber / Jacques Thépot, février 1999 
 
D.R. n° 42  "Solving large unconstrained multilevel lot-sizing problems using a hybrid genetic algorithm", Jully Jeunet, 
mars 1999 
 
D.R n° 43  "Niveau général des taux et spreads de rendement", Maxime Merli, mars 1999 iii 
 
D.R. n° 44  "Doping in Sport and Competition Design", Nicolas Eber / Jacques Thépot, septembre 1999 
 
D.R. n° 45  "Interactions dans les canaux de distribution", Jacques Thépot, novembre 1999 
 
D.R. n° 46  "What sort of balanced scorecard for hospital", Thierry Nobre, novembre 1999 
 
D.R. n° 47  "Le contrôle de gestion dans les PME", Thierry Nobre, mars 2000 
 
D.R. n° 48  ″Stock timing using genetic algorithms", Jerzy Korczak – Patrick Roger, avril 2000 
 
D.R. n° 49  "On the long run risk in stocks : A west-side story", Patrick Roger, mai 2000 
 
D.R. n° 50  "Estimation des coûts de transaction sur un marché gouverné par les ordres : Le cas des composantes du 
CAC40", Laurent Deville, avril 2001 
 
D.R. n° 51  "Sur une mesure d’efficience relative dans la théorie du portefeuille de Markowitz", Patrick Roger / Maxime 
Merli, septembre 2001 
 
D.R. n° 52  "Impact de l’introduction du tracker Master Share CAC 40 sur la relation de parité call-put", Laurent Deville, 
mars 2002 
 
D.R. n° 53  "Market-making, inventories and martingale pricing", Patrick Roger / Christian At / Laurent Flochel, mai 
2002 
 
D.R. n° 54  "Tarification au coût complet en concurrence imparfaite", Jean-Luc Netzer / Jacques Thépot, juillet 2002 
 
D.R. n° 55  "Is time-diversification efficient for a loss averse investor ?", Patrick Roger, janvier 2003 
 
D.R. n° 56  “Dégradations de notations du leader et effets de contagion”, Maxime Merli / Alain Schatt, avril 2003 
 
D.R. n° 57  “Subjective evaluation, ambiguity and relational contracts”, Brigitte Godbillon, juillet 2003 
 
D.R. n° 58  “A View of the European Union as an Evolving Country Portfolio”, Pierre-Guillaume Méon / Laurent Weill, 
juillet 2003 
 
D.R. n° 59  “Can Mergers in Europe Help Banks Hedge Against Macroeconomic Risk ?”, Pierre-Guillaume Méon / 
Laurent Weill, septembre 2003 
 
D.R. n° 60  “Monetary policy in the presence of asymmetric wage indexation”, Giuseppe Diana / Pierre-Guillaume 
Méon, juillet 2003 
 
D.R. n° 61  “Concurrence bancaire et taille des conventions de services”, Corentine Le Roy, novembre 2003 
 
D.R. n° 62  “Le petit monde du CAC 40”, Sylvie Chabi / Jérôme Maati 
 
D.R. n° 63  “Are Athletes Different ? An Experimental Study Based on the Ultimatum Game”, Nicolas Eber /  Marc 
Willinger 
 
D.R. n° 64  “Le rôle de l’environnement réglementaire, légal et institutionnel dans la défaillance des banques : Le cas 
des pays émergents”, Christophe Godlewski, janvier 2004 
 
D.R. n° 65  “Etude de la cohérence des ratings de banques avec la probabilité de défaillance bancaire dans les pays 
émergents”, Christophe Godlewski, Mars 2004 
 
D.R. n° 66  “Le comportement des étudiants sur le marché du téléphone mobile : Inertie, captivité ou fidélité ?”, 
Corentine Le Roy, Mai 2004 
 




D.R. n° 68  “On the Backwardness in Macroeconomic Performance of European Socialist Economies”, Laurent Weill, 
September, 2004 
 
D.R. n° 69  “Majority voting with stochastic preferences : The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its 
members”, Pierre-Guillaume Méon, September, 2004 
 
D.R. n° 70  “Modélisation de la prévision de défaillance de la banque : Une application aux banques des pays 
émergents”, Christophe J. Godlewski, octobre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 71  “Can bankruptcy law discriminate between heterogeneous firms when information is incomplete ? The case 
of legal sanctions”, Régis Blazy, october 2004 
 
D.R. n° 72  “La performance économique et financière des jeunes entreprises”, Régis Blazy/Bertrand Chopard, octobre 
2004 
 
D.R. n° 73  “Ex Post Efficiency of bankruptcy procedures : A general normative framework”, Régis Blazy / Bertrand 
Chopard, novembre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 74  “Full cost pricing and organizational structure”, Jacques Thépot, décembre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 75  “Prices as strategic substitutes in the Hotelling duopoly”, Jacques Thépot, décembre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 76  “Réflexions sur l’extension récente de la statistique de prix et de production à la santé et à l’enseignement”, 
Damien Broussolle, mars 2005 
 
D. R. n° 77  “Gestion du risque de crédit dans la banque : Information hard, information soft et manipulation ”, Brigitte 
Godbillon-Camus / Christophe J. Godlewski 
 
D.R. n° 78   “Which Optimal Design For LLDAs”, Marie Pfiffelmann 
 
D.R. n° 79  “Jensen and Meckling 30 years after : A game theoretic view”, Jacques Thépot 
 
D.R. n° 80  “Organisation artistique et dépendance à l’égard des ressources”, Odile Paulus, novembre 2006 
 
D.R. n° 81  “Does collateral help mitigate adverse selection ? A cross-country analysis”, Laurent Weill –Christophe J. 
Godlewski, novembre 2006 
 
D.R. n° 82  “Why do banks ask for collateral and which ones ?”, Régis Blazy - Laurent Weill, décembre 2006 
 
D.R. n° 83  “The peace of work agreement : The emergence and enforcement of a swiss labour market institution”, D. 
Broussolle, janvier 2006. 
 
D.R. n° 84  “The new approach to international trade in services in view of services specificities : Economic and 
regulation issues”, D. Broussolle, septembre 2006. 
 
D.R. n° 85  “Does the consciousness of the disposition effect increase the equity premium” ?, P. Roger, juin 2007 
 
D.R. n° 86  “Les déterminants de la décision de syndication bancaire en France”, Ch. J. Godlewski 
 
D.R. n° 87  “Syndicated loans in emerging markets”, Ch. J. Godlewski / L. Weill, mars 2007 
 
D.R. n° 88  “Hawks and loves in segmented markets : A formal approach to competitive aggressiveness”, Claude 
d’Aspremont / R. Dos Santos Ferreira / J. Thépot, mai 2007 
 
D.R. n° 89  “On the optimality of the full cost pricing”, J. Thépot, février 2007 
 
D.R. n° 90  “SME’s main bank choice and organizational structure : Evidence from France”, H. El Hajj Chehade / L. 
Vigneron, octobre 2007 v 
 
   
D.R n° 91  “How to solve St Petersburg Paradox in Rank-Dependent Models” ?, M. Pfiffelmann, octobre 2007 
 
D.R. n° 92  “Full market opening in the postal services facing the social and territorial cohesion goal in France”, D. 
Broussolle, novembre 2007 
 
D.R. n° 2008-01     A behavioural Approach to financial puzzles, M.H. Broihanne, M. Merli,  
P. Roger, janvier 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-02    What drives the arrangement timetable of bank loan syndication ?, Ch. J. Godlewski, février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-03    Financial intermediation and macroeconomic efficiency, Y. Kuhry, L. Weill, février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-04   The effects of concentration on competition and efficiency : Some evidence from the french audit 
market, G. Broye, L. Weill, février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-05   Does financial intermediation matter for macroeconomic efficiency?, P.G. Méon, L. Weill, février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-06   Is corruption an efficient grease ?, P.G. Méon, L. Weill, février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-07  Convergence in banking efficiency across european countries, L. Weill, février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-08  Banking environment, agency costs, and loan syndication : A cross-country analysis, Ch. J. Godlewski, 
mars 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-09  Are French individual investors reluctant to realize their losses ?, Sh. Boolell-Gunesh / M.H. Broihanne / 
M. Merli, avril 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-10  Collateral and adverse selection in transition countries, Ch. J. Godlewski / L. Weill, avril 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-11  How many banks does it take to lend ? Empirical evidence from Europe, Ch. J. Godlewski, avril 2008. 
 
D.R. n° 2008-12  Un portrait de l’investisseur individuel français, Sh. Boolell-Gunesh, avril 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-13   La déclaration de mission, une revue de la littérature, Odile Paulus, juin 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-14   Performance et risque des entreprises appartenant à des groupes de PME, Anaïs Hamelin, juin 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-15  Are private banks more efficient than public banks ? Evidence from Russia,   Alexei Karas / Koen 
Schoors / Laurent Weill, septembre 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-16  Capital protected notes for loss averse investors : A counterintuitive result, Patrick Roger, septembre 
2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-17  Mixed risk aversion and preference for risk disaggregation, Patrick Roger, octobre 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-18   Que peut-on attendre de la directive services ?, Damien Broussolle, octobre 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-19  Bank competition and collateral : Theory and Evidence, Christa Hainz / Laurent Weill  / Christophe J. 
Godlewski, octobre 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-20  Duration of syndication process and syndicate organization, Ch. J. Godlewski, novembre 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-21  How corruption affects bank lending in Russia, L. Weill, novembre 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-22  On several economic consequences of the full market opening in the postal service in the European 




D.R. n° 2009-01  Asymmetric Information and Loan Spreads in Russia: Evidence from Syndicated Loans, Z. 
Fungacova, C.J. Godlewski, L. Weill 
 
 
 